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This paper looks at China’s aggressive hunt for resources in Africa, reviews the 
criticisms levelled against China regarding its involvement in the contine    examines continuities, 
changes and the dynamics of China’s Africa policy, and evaluates the prospects of integrating 
human rights into China’s foreign policy. Given growing trade and investment relationship between 
China and Africa, what is the role of human rights in  hina’s Africa policy? Can China integrate 
human rights into its foreign policy considerations? Drawing on the history of US’ attempt to
integrate human rights into the United States’ foreign policy, what are the prospects of and 
challenges to integrating human rights into China’s Africa policy? Instead of ‘human rights’, might 
the concept of ‘development’ be a more useful but no less effective paradigm for infusing people 
oriented values into China’s Africa policy calculations?
On Friday, April 18, 2008, MV ”An Yue Jiang”, a Chinese ship carrying 77 tonnes of ammunition to Zimbabwe 
was turned away from South Africa after a court refused to allow the weapons to be transported across the 
country.1 The ship, which had been at anchor off Durban on South Africa's        Ocean coast since April 14, 
2008, ran into stiff trouble when the South African Transport and Allied Workers Union (SATAWU) refused to 
unload the weapons and the South African Litigation Center (SALC) brought an emergency legal motion asking 
the court for an order suspending the operation of the permit that authorized the conveyance of arms discharged 
from the vessel. Initially, China saw nothing wrong with the shipment. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman 
Jiang Yu said that the weapons were ordered a year before and was “perfectly normal.”2 Unable to unload its cargo 
in South Africa or other neighbouring countries, the vessel eventually headed home.3 The shipment of an 
estimated three million rounds of ammunition, 1,500 rocket-propelled grenades, and 2,500 mortar rounds amid 
serious political crisis in Zimbabwe and mounting concerns about possible bloodshed in the country renewed 
concerns in many quarters, about China’s growing influence in Africa and also fuelled criticisms of China’s 
human rights policy or lack thereof in the continent.      paper takes a look at China’s aggressive hunt for 
resources in Africa, reviews the criticisms levelled against China regarding its involvement in the continent, and 
evaluates the prospects of integrating human rights consideration into China’s Africa policy. Several questions are 
raised and addressed. What is the role of human rights in China’s Africa policy? Drawing on the history of efforts 
to integrate human rights into the United States’ foreign policy, what are the prospects of and challenges to 
integrating human rights into China’s Africa policy? Instead of ‘human rights’ might the concept of ‘development’ 
be a more useful , but no less effective paradigm for infusing people-oriented values into China’s Africa policy 
calculations?
Since 2000, when China rolled out an economic offensive on Africa, relationships between China and countries in 
Africa have grown steadily.4 China-African trade grew by 700 percent in the 1990s. In 2004, China's export to and 
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import from Africa was over US$10 billion respectively5 and the total trade volume reached US$29.46 billion, an 
increase of 58.9% over 2003. In 2005, Sino-African trade totalled US$32 billion. Between January and November 
2007, China-Africa trade volume reached US$65.9 billion: an increase of 31% compared with the same period in 
2006.6 China-Africa Trade is expected to top US$100 billion by 2010.7 According to China’s Ministry of 
Commerce, bilateral trade volume between China and South Africa and China and Angola each surpasses US$10 
billion in 2006. South Africa and Angola are ranked 29 and 31 amongst China’s major trading partners. Chinese 
investment in Africa is also growing. In 2004 alone, 7  Chinese-funded enterprises were established in Africa, 
with total contracted investment of US$432 million and actual investment of US$135 million. By the end of 2004, 
an estimated 715 Chinese-funded enterprises were operating in Africa with a total contracted investment of 
US$1.36 billion and actual investment of US$625 million. In November 2007, the Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China acquired 20 percent of the shares of Africa's largest bank, the Standard Bank of South Africa, with 
US$5.5 billion. This is reportedly “the largest foreign investment in Africa,” and “China's largest overseas 
investment.” 8
2006 was China’s unofficial Year of Africa.9  China’s Africa Policy was issued in January 2006.10 In 
issuing its Africa policy, Beijing wished “to present    the world the objectives of China's policy towards Africa 
and the measures to achieve them, and its proposals for cooperation in various fields in the coming years, with a 
view to promoting the steady growth of China-Africa relations in the long term and bringing the mutually-
beneficial cooperation to a new stage.”11 The scope of the unfolding relationship is potentially wide. China’s 
Africa Policy promises enhanced cooperation in a broad range of fields including the political field, the economic 
field, the field of education, science, technology, culture, and health, and the field of peace and security. In the 
economic field, for example, Beijing promises enhanced cooperation in the areas of trade, investment, finance, 
agriculture, infrastructural development, tourism, debt relief and debt reduction, and resource cooperation. 
Specifically, China promises to “do its best to provide and gradually increase assistance to African nations 
.”12
There is a broad consensus that what drives the present Sino-African relation is China’s need for oil and other 
natural resources. However, energy and natural resource investments appear to be just one part of China’s interest 
in Africa.
The pattern of trade between China and Africa indicates that gaining access to the continent’s foreign resources is 
a priority for Beijing. China’s imports from Africa conce       on crude oil and other natural resources. Enviable, 
double-digit economic growth in China in the past two decades has pushed up energy consumption and demands 
in the country making energy security a top priority for Beijing. In the 1950s, China was      sufficient in oil. 
China has been a net oil importer since 1993. Today, C     is the world’s second largest consumer of oil behind 
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United States.13  The Energy Information Administration predicts that China's oil demand will reach 9.4 million 
bbl/d by 2020, with net imports of 5.9 million bbl/d, making it a major factor in the world oil market.14
Given present domestic demands for oil, growing future dependence on oil imports, and Beijing‘s 
declared intention to build a national strategic petroleum reserve, Africa is of strategic importance to China.15
Expansion of exploration and production joint ventures with foreign companies is a top priority for Beijing. 
China’s foray into Africa is calculated. The modus operandi is quite simple. Backed by Beijing, state-owned 
Chinese firms court supplier states in Africa by cultivating bilateral relations and promising aid, increased 
commerce, and other forms of development assistance. L     g this resource hunt are the China Petrochemical 
Corporation (Sinopec),16 the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC),17 and the China National Offshore 
Oil Corporation (CNOOC).18 It is reported that the China’s Ministry of Commerce and the National Development 
and Reform Commission have published a list of countries and resources in which investment is eligible for state 
subsidies, a clear effort to encourage resource hunt.19
China’s effort is paying off. Today, Africa is a key oil exporter to China. In 2005, about 30 percent of 
China’s total oil import (nearly 701,000 bpd) came from Africa.20 China has oil business deals with majority, if 
not most, of the countries in Africa that currently produce oil or have confirmed oil reserves. China has sought oil 
deals from numerous countries in the region including Nigeria, Sudan, Angola, Chad, Algeria, Gabon, Equatorial 
Guinea, and the Republic of Congo.
The relationship between China and Africa dates back to the 1950s. Indeed the foundation stone of China-Africa 
relations was laid in 1955 at the Asia-African Conference (the Bandung Conference) held in Ba       Indonesia  
from April 18-April 24, 1955. Today, China has diplomatic and economic ties with 53  ountries in Africa. 
China’s foray into Africa reflects China’s interest in expanding South-South cooperation. China believes that 
“[w]ith huge market potential and special features of       development models, [developing countries] may 
support one another and draw on each other's strong points to achieve common development for mutual benefit.”21
Beijing’s vision is that through active cooperation, developing countries can change the present rules of the game 
in the international system.22
The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (“Forum” or “FOCAC”) was formally launched in October 2000 to serve 
as a vehicle for promoting China-Africa friendship and cooperation. In October 2000, Beijing hosted a ministerial 
conference of the Forum (“First Ministerial Conference”), the first of its kind in the history of China-Africa 
relations.23 FOCAC serves as the official platform for “collective              and dialogue and a cooperation 
mechanism” between China and cooperating African States (the Two Sides).24 Five core documents spell out the 
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legal and policy framework of the unfolding trade and investment relations between the Two Sides (the 
Framework Documents). These are: the 2000 Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (the 
2000 Beijing Declaration),25 the 2000 Programme for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social 
Development (the 2000 Programme for Cooperation), 26 the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Addis Ababa 
Action Plan 2004-2006 (Addis Ababa Action Plan),27 the Declaration of the Beijing Summit Of the Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation (“Declaration of the Beijing Summit”)28 and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation -
Beijing Action Plan 2007-2009 (2007-2009 Action Plan).29 There is, as yet, no free trade agreement between the 
Two Sides although there are bilateral trade and investment agreements between China and individual countries in 
the continent. 
China’s hunt for natural resources has been a boon for some countries in Africa. The relationship is allowing 
resource-rich states in the continent “to exploit untapped resources to gain leverage and to negotiate better deals 
with older customers.” Arguably, there is opportunity     both sides to benefit. On the one hand, China’s 
extraordinary growth is increasing its dependence on foreign, including Africa’s resources. On the other hand, 
China’s demand for resources could pave the way for African states to maximize the returns from their natural 
resources, acquire needed technology, and improve their infrastructure. On November 4, 2006, Chinese President 
Hu Jintao announced an eight-point development agenda that offered hope for Africa's development. Among the 
measures was a plan to establish a US$5 billion China-Africa development fund to encourage and support Chinese 
enterprises to invest in Africa. On March 14, 2007, the Chinese government (the       Council) approved the 
establishment of the China-Africa Development Fund ("The CADFund").30 The China-Africa Development Fund 
started business on June 26, 2007. According to China Development Bank, which provided the first-phase funding 
for the project, CADFund will invest in the Chinese enterprises whose trade and economic activities have reached 
or will reach Africa and the enterprises and projects in Africa invested or to be invested by Chinese enterprises.31
The possibility of a win-win outcome may be undercut by the fact that although       n leaders have 
openly welcomed Beijing’s courtship, they have been slow to formulate strategies that will ensure that Africa and 
Africans benefit from the unfolding relationship.32 So far, Beijing is defining the terms of engagement and 
discussions revolve around Beijing’s plans and strategies.
Undoubtedly, a need for natural resources presently drives China’s Africa policy. Whether there is any room for 
human right consideration in Beijing’s foreign policy              is debatable.33 According to David Zweig and 
Bi Jianhai, “Beijing has been able to adapt its foreign policy to its domestic development strategy.”34 It is not 
surprising that China’s African Policy is silent on the place of human rights in Beijing’s policy towards Africa. 
According to China’s African Policy, “[s]incerity, equality and mutual benefit, solidarity and common 
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development” are the principles guiding China-Africa exchange and cooperation and the driving force    lasting 
China-Africa relations. As yet, the human rights implications of these highly malleable terms are unclear. 
The apparent absence of human rights considerations in China’s Africa policy is a concern to critics. One 
important feature of Beijing’s resource-based foreign policy David Zweig and Bi Jianhai have observed “is that it 
has little room for morality.”35 Four aspects of China’s policy in Africa of concern to critics are: (a) Beijing’s 
general indifference to human rights situation in the continent; (b) Beijing’s de facto support of brutal dictators; (c) 
Beijing’s direct and indirect interference in unilateral and multilateral human rights initiatives; and (d) Beijing’s 
perceived insensitivity to trade/human rights linkages.
Critics accuse China of deliberate indifference to human rights situation in Africa. According to Kenneth Roth, 
Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, “[w]hen it comes to human rights, China foreign policy is 
deliberately agnostic.”36 The perceived indifference is rooted in China’s policy of non-interference in internal 
affairs of sovereign states. To China, human rights are relative, and each country must have the freedom to define 
its understanding of human rights and timetable for reaching them. Regarding the crisis in Sudan, China’s Deputy 
Foreign Minister is quoted as saying: “[b]usiness is business. We try to separate politics from business. Secondly, I 
think the internal situation in Sudan is an internal affair, and we are not in a position to impose on them.”37 Critics 
believe that Beijing’s non-interference policy is anything but neutral. As Roth put it, “[w]hen Western 
governments try to use economic pressure to secure human rights improvements, China's no-strings rule gives 
dictators the means to resist.”38
Beijing is also accused of propping up repressive regimes in Africa to the detriment of the ordinary Africans. 
China’s top three crude-oil suppliers in Africa are Angola, Sudan and Congo – countries with grim human rights 
record. China is the leading developer of Sudan’s oil reserve.39 CNPC is the largest shareholder in the Greater Nile 
Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC), the principle consortium involved in oil exploration and production in 
Sudan.40 In 1999 China's imported less than one percent of its       oil imports from Sudan. Today, China is 
Sudan's main oil producer, exporter, and importer.41 According to Dr. Yitzhak Shichor, Professor of East Asian 
Studies and Political Science at the University of Haifa, “China's total imports from Sudan increased tenfold, from 
US $1.47 million in 1998 … to US $1.71 billion in 2004. In 2004, 64.3 percent of Sudan's total oil exports went to 
China. Today, China is Sudan's top trading partner. Nicholas D. Kristof, op-ed columnist for the New York Times 
has accused China of “abetting genocide in Darfur and in effect undermining     U.N. military deployment 
there.”42 He writes that “in exchange for access to Sudanese oil, Beijing is financing, diplomatically protecting and 
supplying the arms for the first genocide of the 21st century.”43
Beyond China’s indifference to human rights conditions in Africa is the concern that Beijing is undermining 
unilateral and multilateral efforts to isolate rouge governments in Africa and punish them for failing to respect 
human rights. According to Roth, “China’s policies have not only propped up some of the continent’s worst 
human rights abusers, but also weakened the leverage of others trying to promote greater respect for human 
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rights.”44  In the past, Beijing has either blocked or abstained from voting on UN resolutions designed to impose a 
measure of sanctions against the Sudanese government.  n July 30, 2004, China abstained from voting on 
resolution 1556 that demanded the disarmament of the janjaweed militias in Darfur and threatened further
measures in the event of non-compliance.45 On April 25, 2006, China abstained from voting on resolution 1672 
that imposed financial sanctions and travel restrictions on 4 Sudanese.46 On August 31, 2006, China abstained 
from voting on resolution 1706 that had the effect of expanding the mandate of UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to 
include Darfur.47 China eventually voted in favour of a severely weakened resolution 1769 establishing a joint 
UN-AU “hybrid” force to replace resolution 1706 on July 31, 2007.48
China’s arms sale to regimes in Africa is also a concern. According to , between 1955 and 1977, China 
sold about $142 million worth of military equipment to Africa.49 China's arms sales to states and groups in Africa  
made up 10 percent of all conventional arms transfers to the continent      en 1996 and 2003.50 China is the  
largest arms supplier to Sudan. In 2005, China sold $8  million in weapons, aircraft and spare parts to Sudan. 
China has also sold weapons and/or provided military training to a number of other countries including, Equatorial 
Guinea, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. Reports suggest that arms sales from China is more 
centralized than was previously thought. A 1999 RAND Corporation report found that China’s arms transfers were 
not motivated primarily by the desire to generate export earnings but were motivated by foreign policy 
considerations.51 The report also found that the Chinese government exerted more control over transfers than 
previous reported and that China’s weapons export system is quite centralized. While arms sales do not 
violate international human rights norms, the fact that Africa has been plagued by genocidal wars that have 
destroyed millions of lives and undermined human development makes arms sales to brutal regimes and groups in 
Africa a matter of grave concern.  
Whether Sino-Africa trade relations is exploitative in nature and whether Africa and Africans will actually benefit 
from the unfolding relationship is a matter of concern to civil society groups in Africa. There are several concerns. 
First, there is the concern that the structure and pattern of Sino-Africa trade today replicates the pattern of trade 
between countries in Africa and their European colonizers. As China’s Minister Counselor, Liang Guixuan, 
readily admit: “the main products Chinese exports to Africa are machin  y and electronics, textile and apparel, hi-
tech product and finished goods, while imports from Africa concentrate on crude oil, iron ore, cotton, diamond and 
other natural resources and primary goods. For those African countries that do not have much oil or raw materials 
to export, trade with China is less mutually complementary, which result in the rise of their trade deficit.”52
Second, there is a growing belief that China thrives on Africa’s conflict and misery and will do anything to 
maintain the present status quo. Sudan is an example.    Yitzhak Shichor put it, “China's predominance in Sudan 
is an outcome of two complementary processes: China’s search for energy supplies, and Sudan’s internal 
deterioration. Declining security conditions, the growing abuse of human rights, and Khartoum’s alleged support 
terrorism have created a vacuum that has sucked China into Sudan.” Arguably, the status quo benefits China by 
providing a level of political risks that is high enough to deter the international oil companies from competing with 
Chinese corporations for assets in Sudan, yet low enough not to seriously jeopardize business operations.53
                                                            
44 Human rights Watch, “China-Africa Summit: Focus on Human Rights, Not Just Trade,” available at  
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/11/02/china14498.htm
45 See http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/446/02/PDF/N0444602.pdf?OpenElement
46 See S/RES/1672 (2006). Available at: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/326/77/PDF/N0632677.pdf?OpenElement
47 See S/RES/1706 (2006). Available from: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/484/64/PDF/N0648464.pdf?OpenElement
48 See S/RES/1769 (2007). Available from: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/445/52/PDF/N0744552.pdf?OpenElement
49 Esther Pan, “China, Africa, Oil,” (January 26, 2007), available at:   
50 . 
51 Daniel Byman and Roger Cliff, CHINA’S ARMS SALE: MOTIVATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS (1999).
52 Perspectives on China-Africa Trade And Economic Cooperation----Presentation by Minister Counselor Liang Guixuan at the 
4th Tswalu Dialogue. http ://za.china-embassy.org/eng/znjl/t194633.htm
53 Erica S. Downs, “The Fact and Fiction of S ino-African Energy Relations,” China Security, Vol. 3 No. 3, Summer 2007, pp. 
42-64 (noting that the status quo in Sudan “benefit CONPC by providing a level of political risk that is high enough to deter the 
3.2.1   Arms Sales
3.2.2 Insensitivity to Trade/Human Rights Linkages
Le Monde
ipso facto
Id
Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology                Vol. 4, Issue 2 (2009) 
4.1 Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy
92
Third, China has been implicated in the atrocities in Darfur and Chinese corporations are accused of human 
rights (e.g. labour rights) violations elsewhere in Africa. Regarding Darfur, Allegations are rife that Beijing is not 
only arming Khartoum but is also cooperating in the forced displacement of peasants from some oil concession 
regions. 
Critics expect Beijing to do more to promote human rig    in Africa. Specifically, there has been pressure on 
Beijing to condemn atrocities in Darfur and withdraw active support to dictators in the region. As Sophie 
Richardson, Deputy Director at Human Rights Watch (Asia Division) put it, “China insists that it will not 
‘interfere’ in other countries’ domestic affairs, but it also claims to be great friend of the African people and a 
responsible major power. But that doesn’t square with         silent while mass killings go on in Darfur.”54 At the 
very least, critics expect China to use its leverage to stop the repressive practices of its closest allies. Regarding 
Zimbabwe, Human Rights Watch has called on China to “refuse to sell censoring technology to Mugabe, who uses 
it to brutally repress his real and imaginary opponents.”55 On Darfur, Human Rights Watch recommended that 
China suspend aid to Sudan and press Sudanese President, Omar El Bashir, to permit the presence of a UN 
peacekeeping force.56 Nicholas Kristof has also argued that China’s intervention in Sudan is crucial57 and U.S 
Congressmen have also weighed in the issue and are demanding more action from Beijing. In a strongly worded 
letter to China's President Hu Jintao, more than 100 U.S. congressmen hinted that the Beijing's 2008 Olympic 
Games could be affected if China fails to try to halt the bloodshed in Darfur.58
Beijing has not been entirely immune to criticisms. China has denied allegations that it supplied arms to 
Sudan for use in Darfur. In April, 2007, China urged Sudan “in unusually strong terms” to show greater flexibility 
on the UN peace plan for Darfur.59 Overcoming its long-standing policy on non-interference, in May 2007, China 
appointed Liu Giujin as a special Africa envoy to focus on Darfur following criticism of its role in Sudan.60
Beijing has also sent nearly 300 military engineers to help international peacekeeping forces in Darfur. Whether 
these gestures suggest a new beginning for China or just a public-relations exercise designed to placate its critics 
remains to be seen. 
Can China integrate human rights into its Africa polic  and, if so, how? Why? What are the prospects? What are 
the challenges? What lessons may be gained from U.S. e      nce with integrating human rights into its foreign 
policy?
Human rights in United States foreign policy has had a checkered past and continues to play an ambiguous role in 
U.S. foreign policy calculations today. Prior to 1970, U.S. foreign policy was largely devoid of human rights 
considerations. Although the United States was instrumental in crafting the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) and was a key architect of the main huma  rights bodies of the United Nations, “it took until the 
late 1970s for human rights to be explicitly made a major part of US foreign policy formulation.”61
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While President Jimmy Carter declared human rights to    a “central concern” of U.S. foreign policy during his 
administration, succeeding presidents did not necessary follow suit. Under           Reagan, the policy of 
realpolitik advanced by Henry Kissinger did not include human rights calculations.62 Indeed, when confronted 
with the issue of a U.S. human rights policy, Kissinger, at his confirmation as the Secretary of State, stated: “I 
believe it is dangerous for us to make the domestic policy of countries around the world a direct objective of U.S. 
foreign policy.” In a 1977 article, Kissinger argued that one of the basic challenges of foreign policy was “the 
perennial tension between morality and pragmatism.” Although admitting that human rights “must be an essential 
component” of U.S. foreign policy, he argued that to pursue it effectively, the U.S. “must take the measure of the 
dangers and dilemmas along the way.” Kissinger cautioned that because human rights advocacy is a powerful 
political weapon, the U.S. must be careful that in its application, all moral dividing lines are not eroded. 
The human rights policy of the 1970s was “a reaction to a foreign policy largely devoid of ethical 
considerations.”63 It took acts of Congress, prodded by sophisticated and well-informed civil society groups in the 
United States for the idea of a U.S. human rights policy to be taken seriously.64 The idea for a U.S. human rights  
policy was a direct result of the 1974 report issued by a subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. 
The report entitled “Human Rights in the World Community: A Call for U.S. Leadership” called on the State 
Department to raise the priority of human rights in foreign policy and noted that hitherto, the U.S. government had 
embraced governments that practiced torture, and unabashedly violated every human rights guarantee pronounced 
by the world community. Following the 1974 report, Congress passed several legislations tying foreign aid to 
human rights performance.65 The result was that by 1976 “a substantial amount of legislation, all initiated by 
Congress in the face of outright opposition by, or at best tepid approval of, the Nixon-Ford administrations was in 
place and ready for the Carter administration to use.”66
The 1974 report and the human rights legislations of the decade did not ensure the automatic integration of human 
rights into U.S. foreign policy. Tension between Congr    and the Executive Branch on the wisdom of such 
integration and the methods of integration was rife. According to Roberta Cohen, “[i]t was an out and out war. 
When State Department Officials in the Nixon and Ford     nistrations were called upon to testify before 
Congress on the human rights of governments receiving US military aid or sales, they largely defended the records 
of those governments. The term “clientism” towards foreign governments came to describe this over-identification 
with foreign governments accused of human rights abuses
Overall, integrating human rights in U.S. foreign policy is a recent undertaking and one that is plagued with 
tensions at home, inconsistencies abroad, and disappointments overall. When past presidents, such as President 
Jimmy Carter, have embraced the human rights policy proposed by Congress and sought to make the promotion of 
human rights a key aspect of U.S. foreign policy, it has been based on at least three rationales. First, the argument 
is made that advancing freedom overseas is in line with core American values reflected in the country’s 
Constitution and bill of rights and would regain for U.S. what moral stature the country has lost.67 Second, it is 
argued that promoting human rights abroad would serve     U.S. national interest. In other words, by expanding 
human rights and democracy throughout the world, U.S.          interest will be indirectly enhanced. Third, it is 
also argued that the U.S. has a legal rights and a res            to promote human rights under international law. 
Overall, the argument is made that promoting human rights and pursuing other foreign policy objectives are not 
mutually exclusive objectives but are complimentary objectives that can be pursued simultaneously. 
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What are the lessons for China and its critics? First, it may be unrealistic, given China’s history, to expect Beijing 
to immediately integrate human rights into China’s foreign policy. Second, integrating human rights into foreign 
policy is often a direct result of pressure from domestic constituencies. Because China presently lacks a strong 
civil society, there is no internal pressure for reform nor is one likely to develop in the near future. Third, the call 
for infusion of human rights consideration into China’s Africa policy should be based on moral, legal or practical 
considerations. Fourth, even assuming that China is willing    integrate human rights into its Africa policy 
considerations, the mechanism for achieving this goal      be seriously considered. Arguably, China need not 
adopt the same tools that United States has relied on. 
For China, there are several challenges to implementin  a human rights policy. The first challenge is 
overcoming China’s long-standing policy of non-interference. China’s own human rights record and China’s 
conception of human rights also pose a challenge. A third challenge is China’s own domestic problems which 
suggest that China is less likely to be seriously involved in addressing long-standing problems in Africa. A final 
challenge is the challenge of finding the moral, legal or practical justification for implementing the human rights 
framework.
Ostensibly, China’s relationship with Africa is based    the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: mutual 
respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal 
affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. "It is never our view that a country should interfere 
in another country's internal affairs," China’s Deputy Foreign Minister Zhai Jun stated in 2006. "We've never 
imposed on other countries our values ... and we do not accept other countries imposing their values on us either," 
the Deputy Foreign Minister added.68 China appears to be quite firm on its policy of non-interference. He 
Wenping, head of African studies at the Chinese Academ  of Social Sciences, notes that the principle of non-
interference “has played a very positive role in developing Chinese influence,"69 that "[d]eveloping countries 
appreciate it very much,”70 and  that “[i]t won't change in the near  future."71
China’s changing stance on the Darfur crisis suggests      Beijing can be flexible in its application of the 
non-interference principle. There are internal and external pressures on China to be flexible. Internally, “China 
wants to be seen as a responsible player on the world    ge with a diplomatic stature to match its growing 
economic might”72 Hosting a successful and protest-free Olympic is also a priority for China.73 Externally, with 
growing criticisms of China’s involvement in Darfur, Beijing is under pressure to manage the expectations of the 
international community while maintaining close ties with Khartoum. In sum, a turn about in China’s policy of 
non-interference is not likely anytime soon. However, incremental adjustments are     off the table. As Dan 
Griffiths rightly notes “China's leaders are pretty conservative in their outlook. They will not want to perform a 
major foreign policy u-turn, but these small moves are a sign that they are willing to be increasingly flexible in 
their approach towards the crisis in Darfur.”74
Whether China is the best candidate to promote human rights in Africa is debatable. Unlike the United States and 
other Western democracies that by and large embrace international human rights law, China does not. The result is 
intense tension between China and Western governments.75 China’s violation of internationally recognized human 
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rights norms is well documented. Herein lies the problem –Beijing may not be much better than the regimes it is 
expected to correct.76 As Gaurav Bhola puts it: “[T]he responsible comity of nations cannot expect China, a 
communist, military-led oppressive regime to be a responsible actor in Africa or internationally; Beijing has no 
experience in good governance, value of human rights,            principles, respect for rule of law, property 
rights ….”77 He goes on to add that “[g]aining valuable experience    these areas based upon a solid foundation of 
democratic principles is necessary before China can be counted upon to be a    ponsible actor with any degree of 
legitimacy at the world stage.”78 Overall, given its own internal problem, Beijing may want to avoid being labelled
a hypocrite for openly criticizing regimes in Africa with questionable human rights records. Beijing may also want 
to avoid opening the door for human rights activism internally.79
China’s political ambition in global affairs is a major obstacle to any effort to get Beijing to integrate human rights 
into its foreign policy. China cannot afford to antagonize states in Africa as such a move could undercut China’s 
effort at leadership on the global stage. Unlike United States, China needs African allies in the United Nations to 
advance its political goals, including preventing Taiw    e independence and diverting attention from its own 
human rights record. 
In the final analysis, China’s economic and security interests may trump human rights considerations. According 
to Breffni O’Rourke “China has never been known for shying away from business on grounds of human-rights 
abuses. Its policy has always been to ignore blemishes in a foreign country's record book, and it similarly expects 
not to be questioned on its own rights performance.”80 In this regard, China is not alone. Matthew Forney writes in 
Times Magazine that “just as oil is seen driving American foreign policy, so too are China's geopolitical strategies 
increasingly influenced by the country's inability to meet its energy needs solely through domestic production.”81
It is unlikely that China will integrate human rights                into its Africa policy anytime soon. This is 
particularly so if human rights are read to mean the norms endorsed by the West and pushed through the 
framework of the United Nations. Yet, while China may           a position to actively promote respect for human 
rights in Africa, at the very least it can refrain from undermining human rights initiatives in the continent. At a 
minimum, China should strive to play a constructive role in the renaissance of Africa, not undermine it. In short, 
China can promote purposeful, people-centered, sustainable development in Africa. The starting point is an 
understanding of what development means in the African         and a critical evaluation of China’s Africa policy 
through the framework of sustainable development. What is needed is a comprehensive strategy for China-Africa 
relations – a strategy that addresses the right to development comprehensively and holistically. While the term 
“human rights” is loaded and invokes much hostility, t   concept of a “right to development”, although also 
controversial, is favoured by China and countries in Africa.  The term “developme    also features very strongly 
in China’s Africa policy. Two questions need to be asked. What does development mean in the context of China-
Africa relations? Is China’s presence in Africa actually promoting development or propping up dictators? 
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Does development mean prestige projects such as fancy       ment houses for dictators, conference centers for 
corrupt leaders and sports stadiums for starving masses or does it mean people-centered, pro-poor, sustainable 
development? Is development possible in a climate of massive corruption and without purposeful leadership from 
the best governing class? The Chinese discourse on human rights prioritizes the right to food, clothing, shelter, and 
economic development – goals desperately needed in Africa today.82 At the very least, therefore, China should 
support measures and institutions that are more likely to be supportive of development. Conversely, China must 
consider withdrawing support from leaders whose polices and practices clearly undermine development. Ian 
Taylor asks: “[W]hat if Chinese diplomacy and activities in engaging with certain African regimes not only 
clashes with the advancement of universal (i.e. Western) norms of human rights but actually helps to further 
undermine development, ostensibly essential to Beijing’s own definition of human rights?” He notes that “[e]ven 
if we accept China’s alternative readings, Beijing’s diplomacy in Africa may in fact help to consolidate 
governments that, as explained above, actively obstruct development because it threatens elites.”
Undoubtedly, China can promote positive development in Africa drawing from its own history and 
experience. Kishore Mahbubani has argued that over the years the Chinese Communist Party              ergone 
substantial transformation. He notes that “[a]fter more than a century of misrule, China is now run by the best 
governing class in generations. Gone are the aging commissars clinging to party rule; they have been replaced by 
leaders committed to moving the country forward.” Therein lies the difference between China and Africa. Unlike 
China’s political class of today who by and large has      ented itself and retained a measure of political 
legitimacy, African leaders by and large lack legitimacy. Unlike the CCP which appears to have a sense of purpose 
and direction in terms of future directions for Chinese development, African leaders appear to lack any sense of 
purpose and direction. While China’s new, sophisticated elite has been able to deliver change, reform and 
economic well-being, African leaders presently do not appear to have the same interest. A win-win relationship 
demands that at the very least China withdraws supports institutions and persons in Africa that undermine 
development.
China’s inroad into Africa should not be readily dismissed. From a human rights standpoint, growing Sino-African 
relations can be a positive force for change in the continent. By opening Chinese market to African export, Beijing 
arguably can make enormous contribution to human development. In theory, China’s eight-point proposal can 
indirectly advance human rights in Africa.  Khalid Malik, the UN resident coordinator in China and resident 
representative of the UN Development Program (UNDP) in the country has observed that China's involvement in 
Africa will help reduce poverty and promote investment in the continent.83
Development is not a concept devoid of meaning in international polic  circles. Today, there are objective 
indicators of whether a country is developing or not.       is also increasing consensus that development, to have 
meaning, must be people-centered rather than centered on the elites. With the United States voting against, and 
Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Canada, Australia, Denmark, Norway and Sweden abstaining, the UN General 
Assembly in 1998 voted to reaffirm the right to development as an integral part of human rights. The right to 
development is also embedded in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the two 
international human rights covenants.84 One of the goals of the UN Charter is to "promote social progress and 
better standards of life in larger freedom." 
Human beings and groups are at the very center of the       to development. Moreover, the right to 
development imposes specific obligations on states. According to the UN Declaration on the Right to 
Development (“Declaration”), “[t]he human person is the central subject of development  nd should be the active 
participant and beneficiary of the right to development.” At the very minimum, the right includes: popular 
participation in development, equality of opportunity   d the creation of favourable conditions for the enjoyment 
of other civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. Article 2 of the Declaration states that “[a]ll human 
beings have a responsibility for development, individually and collectively, taking into account the need for full 
respect for their human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as their duties to the community … and they 
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should therefore promote and protect an appropriate political, social and economic order for development.”85
While States have the right to and the duty to formulate appropriate national development policies, this must be 
done “on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of 
the benefits resulting there from.”86
How might the concept of the right to development affect China’s Africa policy were it to be taken 
seriously? To start with, it is hard to imagine how propping up dictators or arming repressive states with arms to 
be used to destroy their people help to promote a win-win development in Africa. Moreover, China’s policy of 
non-interference may not square well with Beijing’s declared intention of promoting Africa’s development. As Ian 
Taylor rightly notes, 
“[a]ccording to China’s non-interference policy, sovereignty trumps everything and so it is up to 
each country to decide what to do with Beijing’s assistance. But if sovereignty is the guarantor of 
human rights and that sovereignty is being used to effectively undermine developmentalism, then 
there is a profound contradiction at the heart of China’s discourse on human rights. Surely in such 
cases China is complicit in not only siding with autocrats and undermining a nascent human rights 
regime (one now supported by a number of African states). It is also undermining its own 
conception of human rights based on development, as well as its own interpretation of the linkage 
between human rights and sovereignty.”87
There are legal basis for suggesting the right to development as a framework for China’s Africa policy. As a 
member of the United Nations, China has undertaken to “fulfil in good faith” the obligations assumed by it in 
accordance with the UN Charter.88 Among the obligations assumed by China and other Member States, is the  
obligation to support and promote the purposes of the United Nations. One of the main purposes of the United 
Nations expressly stated in the Charter is the goal of achieving international co-operation “in solving international 
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect 
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) also provides a basis for 
integrating the right to development into China’s Africa policy. The Chinese government signed ICESCR in 
October 1997 and ratified it on March 27, 2001.89 Ratification of the ICESCR, according to the Chinese  
government, “fully demonstrates the Chinese Government's positive attitude toward carrying out international 
cooperation in human rights as well as China's firm determination and confidence in promoting and protecting 
human rights.”90 Among the rights endorsed in the ICESR are the right to health, the right to education,   e right 
to self-determination and a right to adequate standard of livi    
Within the context of past Asia-Africa conferences, the Declaration on the New Asian African Strategic 
Partnership (“2005 NAASP Declaration”) adopted in Bandung, on 23 April 2005    important. In the 2005 
NAASP Declaration, attending Heads of States and Governments including China’s President noted that all the 
participants were “independent, sovereign and equal nations striving for the promotion of human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law.” The 2005 NAASP Declaration also underscored “the urgency of promoting 
economic development in the Asian and African regions.” The leaders envisaged “a caring Asian-African society 
where the people live in stability, prosperity, dignity and free from the fear of violence, oppression and injustice.” 
China’s Africa policy can be measured against these development objectives.
In sum, the concept of development is a useful one for evaluating China’s policy in Africa. Every 
developing country, including China, voted in favour of UN General Assembly resolution affirming the right to 
development. The concept of development also features             y in China’s Africa policy. Development is 
also the principle objective of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), an initiative that Beijing 
claims to unequivocally support.91 Introducing the concept of the right to development into China’s Africa policy 
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means asking the development questions: Would Beijing's uncritical support for African tyrants advance people-
centered development or spell disaster for the ordinar  people in the continent? 
The saga of Chinese vessel, MV An Yue Jiang is very telling.92  Initially, a South African government spokesman,  
while confirming that the weapons were aboard the ship on South Africa’s waters, told reporters that the 
government would not interfere with what it regarded as a trade matter between China and Zimbabwe. China's 
Foreign Ministry also issued a statement saying: "China and Zimbabwe maintain normal trade relations. What we 
want to stress is China has always had a prudent and responsible attitude towards arms sales, and one of the most 
important principles is not to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries." Yet, unable to dock and unload its 
cargo in South Africa, Angola, Mozambique or any other country, the Chinese vessel eventually headed home. 
The turn around was as a result of several factors. First, it was the praise-worthy effort of civil society groups in 
Africa including the South African Litigation Centre (SALC). The SALC brought an urgent application in court to 
halt offloading and transport of the arms bound for Zimbabwe. Dock workers in South Africa and neighboring 
countries also openly declared their unwillingness to unload the weapons. Second, the media coverage was
unrelenting and put the spotlight on China. Third, there was an apparent regional consensus that shipping arms to 
Zimbabwe at a critical time in the country’s history was not in the best interest of Zimbabwe or the South African 
region. Fourth, the diplomatic efforts from Washington and London put          on neighbouring states to deny 
docking privilege to the Chinese vessel.  
There are several lessons that may be learned here. First, any change in China’s Africa policy will depend, 
in part, on the capability of non governmental organizations to provide timely and accurate information regarding 
issues and areas of concern. Second, change in China’s Africa policy will also depend on direct and indirect 
diplomatic pressure from other world leaders.93 Third, regional consensus from African leaders and from the  
African civil society on what Africa needs and what is in the best interest of the continent will also send a        
message to Beijing that the tide is turning in Africa  nd that Africans will no longer accept  policies and practices 
that ultimately work to their own detriment. Regarding MV An Yue Jiang, governments of neighbouring countries
individually and collectively declared their displeasure at the arms shipment. The Zambian president, currently 
chairman of the SADC, reportedly called on Zimbabwe's     hbors to unite to stop the delivery of the ammunition
to Zimbabwe, saying the arms could deepen the crisis. He was also quoted in the government-owned Zambia 
Daily Mail, as saying that China could play a more useful role than supplying arms.94
Supporting people-centered, participatory development initiatives in Africa is in China’s interest. The growing 
number of civil society organizations in the continent and the increase in communication technologies in the 
region mean that unlike in the past, blunders by Africa’s trading partners in cooperation with morally-bankrupt 
African leaders will no longer be tolerated and can become public knowledge in a matter if seconds. Given its 
effort to promote a benign image of China abroad, Beijing may not afford smear campaigns elsewhere in the 
world. Supporting people-centered development initiatives in Africa may also be the only way that Beijing can 
ensure predictable access to Africa’s energy resources in the future. Internal conflict over oil could completely 
undermine Chinese investment in oil exploration and production or, at the very least, make such investments less 
than lucrative. While African policy makers are still            by Beijing’s courtship, a conviction is growing 
among Africa’s civil society that trade with China is not necessarily in Africa’s best interest. China must not 
exacerbate growing civil society mistrust of its real          in Africa. A win-win China-Africa relation is one that 
benefits China but also brings about a change in the live of ordinary Africans presently deprived of their basic 
humanity as a result of poverty, systemic corruption, internecine warfare, and oppression.
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93 Zimbabwe’s situation was somewhat unique. Britain has historical ties to Zimbabwe and London appears to be locked in a 
battle with Harare. Will London apply the same pressure to address human rights s ituation in other countries in Africa? 
Ultimately, inconsistencies in the human rights polici   of London and Washington could prove a major obstacle to any effort 
to change China’s record in Africa.
94 The Guardian, China arms ship left with no port of cal  as Britain and US apply pressure, Wednesday April 23 2008, 
http://www.guard ian.co.uk/world/2008/apr/23/zimbabwe.china 
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As the volume of trade and investment between China an  Africa soars, Beijing must increasingly confront vexing 
ethical questions about China's role in the continent. Whether China-Africa relations will benefit ordinary Africans 
or undermine human rights and development gains in the continent will depend as much on the evolution of 
China’s Africa policy as by the measures taken by the leadership in Africa to safeguard the interest of the 
continent. Although Africans have always condemned colonialism in the nineteenth century by the European 
powers, history may be about to repeat itself because African leaders, mesmerized by Beijing’s courtship and bent 
on satisfying their narrow selfish interests, are unwilling to ensure a beneficial outcome for the continent in the 
unfolding relationship. Thus, “[w]hile China has, through various initiatives and offers, generated hope about the 
future prospects of the people of Africa, African leaders are yet to come out with clear-cut proposals on how to 
reap the maximum benefit out of these Chinese initiatives.”95
Ultimately, Richardson is right in her assertion that “Africans do not need another external power enabling 
abusive regimes – they need all powers, including China, to place human rights at the center of their policies.” The 
concept of the right to development is not free from controversy. The concept of development can pit individuals 
against the state and groups against one another. Nevertheless, the concept is arguably less polarizing than the 
concept of human rights. As between China and states i  Africa, there is a consensus that the right should be 
recognized as a fundamental legal right. The time has come for China and leaders in Africa to move from rhetoric 
to action and give life to the right to development. Africans do not need China to enable abusive and corrupt 
regimes in the continent. Rather, Africans need China to put human beings at the center of its Africa policy. China 
should strive to promote development programs that are empowering, participatory, beneficial and sustainable. 
Although there appears to be a gradual shift in China’s policy of non-interference, Beijing must do more, however. 
Doing more means that when quiet diplomacy proves ineffective, Beijing must be willing to withdraw support 
from regimes that destroy the dignity and worth of their citizens. Doing more means asking the development 
question at all times and in every situation. A development framework does not undermine the notion of 
sovereignty because ultimately it is the African people – the ordinary men, women and children in the continent –
not Washington, London, Beijing, Pretoria or Abuja – that will determine if the win-win co-operation that China is 
preaching is a farce or a reality. 
                                                            
95 Dr. Nivedita Ray, :While China Scrambles Africa Builds Hope,” IDSA Strategic Comments, November 9, 2006, availab le at : 
http://www.idsa.in/publications/stratcomments/NiveditaRay091106.htm
9.  Conclusion
